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2 Beijing Foreign Studies University, 2 North Xisanhuan Avenue,Haidian District,Beijing,100089)

【Abstract】 To solve the problem of "Credit Discrimination against SME", firstly the relevant literature
concerning the approaches to the problem is reviewed and deficiencies are pointed out. Then the role of
government and the mode of credit information sharing in foreign countries are analyzed, which can be
valued as the practice basis of E-government services design. Finally, on the basis of policies and
regulations and actual situation in China and theoretical analysis, the paper constructed the value of
cross-organizational information sharing service value network and services model, and designed
E-government service system in SME lending decisions and supervision, as a new perspective to solve the
problem of the discrimination. This study provides a reference for developing countries that have a similar
problem of "Credit Discrimination against SME" and same conditions of credit information.
Key Words：E-government; Credit Discrimination against SME; cross organization information sharing;
service value network
Introduction
Discrimination is primarily a concept of Sociology, and it means a sociological term referring to the
treatment taken toward or against an individual of a certain group in consideration based solely on class or
category[1]. Generally, discrimination appears often in the literature of Sociologist, such as Discrimination
against the Women, Discrimination against the Black, Discrimination against the Old and so on[2-4]. As a
basic and independent unit in society, enterprises also face the problem of discrimination when receiving
bank loans. Large enterprises has more advantages in receiving bank loans compared to small and medium
enterprises, that means the problem of “Credit Discrimination against SME” exists[5]. The Credit
Discrimination against SME refers to the differentiated treatment to small and medium enterprises of bank
loans mainly in the aspect of capital availability, financing cost and financing efficiency[6]. In 2005 China
Growing Small and Medium Enterprises Development Report, the discrimination of state-owned financial
organizations takes up a percentage of 24% ranking No.2 among the reasons for financing difficulties. In
2009 China Small and Medium Enterprise Development Report, small and medium enterprise loans
account for 14.7% of all various kinds of loans in major banks. As a result, the paper is mainly focused on
the problem of Discrimination of SME.
In order to solve the problem of “Credit Discrimination against SME” [7-8], Lin Yifu and Li Zhiyun
empirically concluded that the optimal finance structure in compatible with economic structure is one
centered on small and medium banks, and thus suggested the improvement of small and medium financial
organizations to resolve “Credit Discrimination against SME” [9-12]. Zhang Jie, Wang Xiao and Zhang Qi
etal. and Li Mao et al. pointed it is necessary to lead the development of informal Financing[13-14]. Zhang Qi
et al. also proposed that government should establish the system of financing assurance and government
re-assurance. [15] These researches are mainly from the perspective of changing the currently existing
market structure or changing the capital collocation efficiency. Although some have emphasized it is
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necessary to have ownership innovation and that government should play the right role[16-17], none of them
has touched the point of cross-organization information sharing for bank decision-making service. This
paper aims at exploring the problem of “Credit Discrimination against SME”, studies the government
function, and analyses the information sharing mode in foreign countries. Then, based on the policies and
national conditions in China, the paper designs the cross-organization information sharing decision-making
and supervision service system under the context of E-governance.
1. Research on the Government Role in “Credit Discrimination against SME”
Information asymmetry caused the phenomena of “Credit Discrimination against SME”, and in turn
resulted in Credit Market Failure [18]. Government Information Service and Credit Construction is one of
the effective tools to solve the problem [19].
The emergence and development of New Public Management Theory and New Public Service Theory
in 1970s put forward the ideas that “focus on customer/public, pay attention to their needs, and satisfy their
needs”, and laid a good foundation for the construct of service-oriented government. The function of a
service-oriented government is manifested in economic level and political level. In economic level, the
function of government should include ensuring the normal market competitive order through regulations
and supervisions, and providing the public products and services the market could not provide, etc. In
political level, the government should provide a secure, equal, and democratic environment for all
including vulnerable group, and make a good use of the power given by the people[20]. Therefore, from the
perspective of both political and economic level, the government needs to change their roles from a
management style to service style, and actively explore the solutions to the problem of “Discrimination of
SME loans”.
From the perspective of Service Science, Service is often defined as the application of competences
(resources) for the benefit of another[21]. To solve the problem of “Credit Discrimination against SME”,
government can also take the advantage of its own resources to benefit the lenders, especially small and
medium enterprises. Currently, the source of credit information is mainly from the People’s Bank of China.
In 2007, the registered company in the People’s Bank of China database reached 0.13 billion, among which
45.4% established credit relations with the People’s Bank of China. The government are in control of more
than 60% of the total credit information[22]. To exercise the service function, the government can fully take
advantage of its information resources to establish a loan decision-making support and supervision
e-government platform, and thus promote the enterprise credit system construction.
2. Comparative Analysis on the Credit Information Sharing Mode
“Adverse Selection” and “Moral Hazard” resulted from information asymmetry can be solved in two
methods: Credit Risk Mitigation and Credit Information Sharing. Credit Risk Mitigation is to reduce the
loss or risk affect through the means of mortgage and credit derivatives. However, Credit Risk Mitigation
might not be suitable for small and medium enterprises because small and medium enterprises have a
comparatively small amount of capital and credit derivatives for small and medium enterprises are limited.
Constructing credit information sharing platform is feabile[23].
In the present time, there are mainly two modes of credit information sharing platform: American
Mode—Credit Information Intermediary Support and European Mode—Public Credit Information
Registering. The establishment of American Mode is relying on the massive credit intermediary
resources—Credit Bureau. For example, Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) of America collected great amount of
information of companies, managers, and business owners through on-site and telephone interviews. The
information includes relevant government policies, company trading partners, public information resources,
debt servicing, company funds, company history, management capacity, credit line, and public record etc.
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American mode can fully take advantage of customer scale effect, make individual and group data analysis,
and reduce cost of information collection and credit management service[24]. The two modes can both
realize credit information sharing service. According to the characteristics of service systems [25-26], the
comparisons of the two information sharing modes can be summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparisons on the Enterprise Credit Information Sharing Modes

Operant
Resource
Boundary
Spanners
Information
Connection
Professional
Service

Report Content

American Mode（Credit Bureaus）

European Mode （ Public
Registers）

Natural Monopoly

Government Monopoly

Credit Intermediary formed by Market

Public Credit Registers subordinated to
Central Bank

Voluntary Membership

Central Bank Compulsory Supervision

provide credit evaluation service and
credit management service
Positive Information (Asset, Debt,
Guarantee,
Mode
of
Payment,
Employment, and family background)
Negative Information (breach of
contract)

Credit

mainly provide credit information report

Positive Information ( loan exposure,
guarantee ), Negative Information
(Breach of loans, bankruptcy record)

Length of
Relationship

Case study or statistics analysis

Credit information record sharing

Width of
Relationship

the data of membership banks and
supplementary database such as Taxation
and Court of Law

banks subordinated to Central Banks but
data should beyond a certain thread.

US, UK, Japan etc

Germany,
Belgium

Service

Supervision

low

Graded

Countries
Identification
of roles
Secrecy level

Finland,

Italy,

France,

Edited according to Jappelli T, Pagano M. （2006）. Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience

As shown in Table 1, American Mode is the result of natural monopoly and established through
market-driven voluntary membership with Credit Bureau taking a leading role. The main function is
information and consulting service. The government is to serve the Credit Bureaus and provide the
information they needs. European Mode is the result of government monopoly and adopted compulsory
supervision by central bank with public credit registers taking a leading role[27]. The main function is credit
supervision and information service. The source of the information is commercial banks mainly. The Public
Credit Registers is the main functional agencies and provide credit reference information and supervision
service. It is thus clear that although American Mode and European Mode show differences in their main
functions, government in each mode both show the function of information service in small and medium
enterprise loans. Besides, telecommunication and computer technology play important roles. For example,
in European Mode, based on computer technology, software, and electronic link, the Public Credit
Registers need 10 to 60 staff; 60 staff is needed for enterprise credit information transfer in France[27].
American Mode can provide detailed credit report and credit evaluation service, but it has a
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precondition that the credit information in banks is open to Credit Bureaus and the cost reduction brought
by credit information sharing can counterweight the disadvantage of competition in the same trade[27].
However, according to Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks and The Law on
People's Bank of China, the credit information of banks in China cannot be shared by a Third-Party
only other than the Credit Reference Center under The People’s Bank of China. Therefore, American
Mode does not apply to China. European Mode is characterized by the broad covering that every
Public Credit Registers all need to hand in credit report, but its demerits is single-source of data which
fails to recognize credit risk and fulfill the role of risk management. Therefore, European Mode cannot
solve the problem of “Credit Discrimination against SME” in China as well.
In order to find its own solutions to “Credit Discrimination against SME”, Chinese governments
in all levels should take into its own national conditions and role in market, and learn from the
American Mode and European Mode.
3 The Service Design for “Discrimination of SME” under the context of E-governance
In small and medium enterprises loan, more and more attention has been drawn on the role of
government. Information technology has provided tools and facilities for the realization of government
roles. The development of E-governance can reduce the constraint of government management
technology on government behaviors, partly resolve the contradiction of limited government resources
versus complex public demands, and rationalize the transformation of government roles into
service-oriented [28].
3.1 Theoretical Foundation of Service Design for “Discrimination of SME” under the context of
E-governance
（1）Policies and National Condition Basis

There is no Trade Secrets Protection Acts in China, but as stipulated in Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Commercial Banks and Guidelines for Internal Control of Commercial Banks,
current staff in commercial banks is not allowed to release trade secrets when they are at their post,
which means that it is infeasible to directly introduce market-oriented third-party credit reference
agencies. Meanwhile, according to The Law on People's Bank of China, the People’s Bank of China
can share some customer (enterprise) information because of its role of supervision, which means the
People’s Republic of China Credit Reference Center plays a very important role in E-governance
service. The Decree of Government Information Openness points out that, administrative organizations
cannot give publicity to government information related to trade secrets and personal privacies unless
those are agreed by creditors or administrative organizations assume no harm to public interest.
Therefore, under certain circumstances, government can provide credit information needed by banks
through cross-organization information sharing.
Due to historical reasons of commercial bank development in China, the State-owned banks, such
as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank
of China and the Bank of China, has accumulated a great amount of credit information data because of
their long term dominance, besides they have a close tie to the enterprises in this industry[29]. For those
large enterprises, these banks have risk recognition and evaluation tools; while for small enterprises, it
might not be the case. It would be a good solution to “Credit Discrimination against SME” if
state-owned banks can make full use of their information advantage and enable themselves to evaluate
and supervise small and medium enterprises. The government can help small and medium enterprises
with their loan policy-making by providing the banks with credit information to avoid the problem of
information asymmetry in the loan process.
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The administrative system and monetary system are paralled in China. Different government
organizations are also divided in ther functions. So the problem of “information island” exists for long[30].
These makes the G2B E-government information sharing possible. Meanwhile ,with the development of
credit system and Golden Tax and Golden Custom systems, China has improved the basis for inforamtion
construction.
（2）Theoretical Basis
The research of Godbillon-Camus and Godlewski showed that the application of soft information can
reduce the security for loans required by the banks, and this helps solve the problem that high-tech and
trade enterprises are in lack of tangible mortgage[31]. From the perspective of transaction cost, He and
Wang proposed that it is important and necessary to establish good credit evaluation system because it can
promote the unsecured loans[32]. However, because credit information sharing system is a public product,
banks lacks internal drive to adopt it without government assistance. This necessitates the role of
government in establishing public credit evaluation organizations.
Lejeune and Roehl empirically studied how Canadian banks apply information technology to expand
the potential of developing and communicating information, and how the integration of information
technology and soft element and hard element enabled the development of Canadian banks in 1990s[33].
The E-governance service solution to “Credit Discrimination against SME” should take into account both
the hard and soft information requirement in designing the decision-making and supervision support system.
Meanwhile, it needs the coordination of both information technology and organization structure.
3.2 Service Value Network for “Discrimination of SME” under the Context of E-governance
Based on the analysis of policies and regulations and the national conditions of China, the
cross-organization information sharing service value network to solve “Credit Discrimination against
SME” can be drawn as Diagram 1[34].

Bank

Small and Medium
Enterprise
Production and
Operation Platform

SME

Financial
Service

SME
Bank

Dig. 1. Cross-organization Credit Information Sharing Service Value Network
As Dig. 1, Finance Intermediary Agent can be stratified as four levels, the credit service agent of
bank level, the Credit Grading Agency of Small and Medium Enterprise level, the general information
integration service level, and the basic government information pick-up level. These levels are
connected through service protocol and contract. Industry and Commerce Department, Taxation
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Department, and Custom Department take the role of information pick-up and transfer. Small and
Medium Enterprise Production and Operation Platform directly collects the first hand information and
processes them. The Credit Reference Center of the People’s Bank of China will be responsible for
integrating and summarizing the information. The Credit Grading Agency of Small and Medium
Enterprise provide service as credit risk evaluation and credit management. Surely the bank can
directly get data from the Credit Reference Center and Small and Medium Enterprise Production and
Operation Platform to fulfill the role of credit risk and management. The Small and Medium
Enterprise Production and Operation Platform plays a very critical role to solve the problem of Credit
Discrimination against SME, and the Credit Reference Center is also important as the hub for G2B
cross-organization information sharing.
3.3 Constructing the Model of E-governance Small and Medium Enterprise Loans Decision-making
and Supervision Service System
According to the Bank to Government (G2B) cross-organization information sharing goals and the
maxims to corresponding service system design, the Small and Medium Enterprise Loans Decision-making
Service System can be constructed taking into account the cross-organization information sharing service
value network as Dig. 2.

Process decomposition of SME
Project
Information

Credit Rating
Information

Assessment
Information

Managing
Information

Harden
Soft information
needs
China
Association of
Small and
Medium

Hard information
needs

E-government supporting
credit decision-making
E-government supporting
credit monitoring

Electric Power
Company and
Water
Corporation

Small and Medium Enterprise Bureau
(China SBA)

Value/Supply
Chain

Decision making of SME lending

The Industrial
and Commercial
Bureau
The Tax Bureau
The Bureau of
Quality and
Technical
supervision
Grassroots
network

Dig. 2. Small and Medium Enterprise Decision-making and Supervision Service System based on
E-governance
With the constraint of credit information in control by banks and national policies and regulations, the
decision-making and supervision of small and medium enterprise loans is a multi-object programming
problem and needs to meet the requirements of low risk, low cost, and low demand on staff. Based on the
requirements above, the small and medium enterprise loans process can be disassembled. The information
source is mainly the data on The Small and Medium Enterprise Production and Operation Platform, banks
data and E-governance information collected by the governments. Hard information need and Soft
information need are classified in the phase of project information, credit rating information, managing
information, and assessment information. Soft information can preferrably be transfered into hard
information. Different process is designed according to the different needs of hard information and soft
information, among which, hard information entails the integration role of information technology, while
soft information entails the role of service organization framework. The E-governance decision-making and
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supervision service model in finalized then, and methods like multivariate information integration
calculation, uncertainty reasoning should be employed to analyze the relevant information handed in by
banks. In addition, Model database and expert database should be consulted to ascertain the accuracy of the
information and credit risk. The model of E-governance small and medium enterprise supervision is similar.
The goal of the governments is maximize the service satisfaction, minimize cost and staff demand.
The decision-making and supervision service system of SME loans can provide more accurate and low
cost service and highlights the role of government in solving the problem of “Credit Discrimination
against SME”.
4. Conclusion
To solve the problem of “Credit Discrimination against SME”, government is introduced as the third
party to provide decision-making and supervision service for small and medium enterprise loans.
E-governance, especially credit information sharing can help solve some of the difficulties in small and
medium enterprise loans, reduce the risk and information acquisition cost, and thus strengthen the
bank-enterprise information and trust mechanism. In this manner, the “Credit Discrimination against
SME” is reduced to some extent and the small and medium enterprise loans can be increased, even the
commercial banks pursue the maximum profit and strict check on defective rate. However, this paper is
only a rudimental exploration on the credit information sharing; more research is needed on the aspect of
information recognition and classification, multivariate information integration calculation, uncertainty
reasoning model and the realization of the whole decision-making and supervision service system.
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